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Overview 
Australians are paying too much for power. In the five years to 
2013, the average household power bill rose 70 per cent: from 
$970 to $1660 a year. The prices we pay are also unfair: some 
people are paying more than their fair share. These consumers 
are paying on average about $150 a year more than they should 
to subsidise other consumers. To get fairer and cheaper prices, 
network tariffs need urgent reform.  
Electricity networks transport power from generators to our homes 
and businesses. Like roads and freeways, they are built at a size 
to keep electricity moving at times of maximum demand – peak 
hour. Yet the price we pay to use electricity networks is the same 
whatever the time of day or season. The price therefore provides 
no incentive to use the network efficiently by avoiding peak times.  
It also provides little incentive for network owners to invest 
efficiently because it is unrelated to their main cost: building 
enough infrastructure to meet peak demand and avoid blackouts. 
Network owners spent $17.6 billion on expanding power networks 
between 2009 and 2013. If prices had encouraged consumers to 
use less power in periods of peak demand, $7.8 billion of this 
investment could have been avoided and the savings passed on 
as lower power bills. 
It is widely agreed that reform is needed. Yet there is a lack of 
specific proposals to improve the structure and operation of 
network tariffs. This report, the third in a series of Grattan reports 
on the excessive cost of electricity, fills that gap. 
It proposes two major reforms to the way network companies 
charge customers for the cost of carrying power to homes and 
small businesses. First, the 43 per cent of the consumer bill that 
goes to fund the network should no longer be based on total 
energy use. Instead, consumers should pay for the maximum load 
they put on the network. This tariff is called a capacity-based 
charge because it is based on the capacity of the infrastructure 
that must be built to carry this maximum load. A capacity charge 
far better reflects the cost of building and running the network.  
Yet this reform alone may not reduce peak demand in areas 
where the network is under pressure. Therefore the report also 
proposes the introduction of a new tariff in areas that - in the 
absence of prices that better reflect the cost of running the 
network - will require expensive infrastructure upgrades. Under 
this tariff, consumers will be charged more for use during times 
(usually in summer) when the network is under most strain. 
Because these periods drive total investment in infrastructure, 
reducing peak demand levels ultimately leads to lower prices.  
These reforms will give all consumers incentives to use electricity 
more efficiently. When they do, the pressure on network 
companies to invest in infrastructure will fall, and power prices 
with it. But governments must commit to these reforms and 
carefully explain their benefits. Advanced electricity meters will 
need to be installed on most Australian homes, at material short-
term cost. Politicians may decide it is too hard. But if they do, they 
will miss an opportunity to deliver cheaper and fairer power prices. 
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1 The power system: how it runs and why it needs to change
Grattan Institute’s December 2012 report, Putting the customer 
back in front: how to make electricity prices cheaper, showed how 
fixing the flaws in the regulation of network businesses could save 
consumers $2.2 billion a year. Grattan’s December 2013 report, 
Shock to the system: dealing with falling electricity demand, 
identified actions governments must take to address the 
consequences of unprecedented falls in electricity consumption. 
One of these actions was to “begin the hard task of reforming 
network tariffs so that the prices companies charge reflect the 
costs they incur.” This third report shows how the reform could be 
done. 
The current structure of charges is not only unfair, it does not 
encourage the most cost-effective use of the electricity network. 
To make the system both fairer and cheaper, this report argues 
that existing network charges must be replaced with tariffs that 
reflect the real cost that customer choices impose on the network 
businesses that carry power to the home.  
Under the changes, tariffs would consist of: 
• A capacity charge, based on a customer’s maximum electricity 
consumption, to replace tariffs based on overall electricity use. 
• A critical peak price tariff in areas where a change in user 
behaviour could remove or delay the need for new network 
investment. 
• A standing charge to cover the cost of account management 
and fixed costs to maintain the network connection. 
To understand the need for these changes it is first necessary to 
understand the operation of the electricity system, and especially 
the networks that carry power from the generator to the home. 
1.1 The role of networks in the power system 
Electricity is produced at a power station and transported to 
customers through high voltage transmission networks and low 
voltage distribution networks. The system is operated by four 
kinds of business: generators, retailers, and transmission and 
distribution businesses. The last two are often collectively called 
network businesses. 
Retailers collect payments from customers, and then pay power 
stations for the electricity they generate, and distribution 
businesses for use of the electricity network. Distribution 
businesses then pay transmission businesses for use of the high 
voltage network. Figure 1 shows a simplified version of this 
system. 
This report uses the term network tariff to describe the prices that 
retailers pay to distribution businesses for use of both the 
distribution and transmission networks.1 
                                            
1
 On distribution businesses’ tariff schedules, this is referred to as the ‘Network 
Use of System’ tariff. 
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Figure 1: How electricity and payments flow through the power 
system 
 
Source:  Grattan Institute 
Network tariffs make up a substantial portion of household power 
bills. On average, they comprise about 43 per cent of the average 
annual bill, or $720 a year. In the past five years, power bills have 
increased from $970 to $1660 a year.2 Figure 2 shows a 
breakdown of the average Australian power bill in 2013. 
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 These figures are expressed in nominal terms. In real terms, bills increased 
from $1110 to $1660 – a 50 per cent increase. 
Figure 2: Breakdown of an average household power bill, 2012-13 
$ / year 
Note:  ‘Other costs’ include the Large and Small-scale Renewable Energy Target and 
state-based schemes such as feed-in tariff schemes, energy savings schemes in New 
South Wales, Victoria and South Australia, the Queensland Gas Scheme and Western 
Australian Tariff Equalisation Contribution. 
Sources:  ABS (2013a), ABS (2013b), ABS (2013c), ABS (2011), AEMC (2013a), AEMO 
(2014), AER (2013b), BREE (2013a), BREE (2013b), ESCV (2014), IMO (2014), IPART 
(2013), QCA (2014), SA Power Networks (2013), Synergy (2013). 
Figure 3 shows that the cost of using the power network varies 
widely between states. Customers in Western Australia pay an 
average of only about $460 a year, while Tasmanians pay more 
than $1100 a year.  
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Figure 3: Household network charges vary widely between states 
Average $ / year 
Note:  Chart shows average power bills split by network costs and non-network costs by 
state in 2012-13. 
Sources:  ABS (2013a), ABS (2013b), ABS (2013c), AEMC (2013a), AEMO (2014), AER 
(2013b), BREE (2013a), BREE (2013b), ESCV (2014), IMO (2014), IPART (2013), QCA 
(2014), SA Power Networks (2013), Synergy (2013). 
In the way they raise revenue, network businesses are different 
from power generators. Generators operate in a competitive 
market. If the price of power falls or they sell less of it, generators 
earn less money. Network businesses, by contrast, work in a 
highly regulated market. The Australian Electricity Regulator 
determines the amount of revenue that they are allowed to earn 
each year and approves the prices that they charge.3 
Each geographical area only has one distribution and one 
transmission business. In other words, network businesses are 
regulated monopolies. This is because it would be impractical and 
prohibitively expensive to have multiple physical networks 
competing to deliver electricity from the same generators and to 
the same customers. 
1.2 Current charges do not tackle peak demand 
Distribution companies (and before them the state-owned 
corporations that once ran the whole power system) historically 
measured household consumption of electricity by sending a 
meter reader to the home. The standard accumulation meter, 
located at the front of each home, is a relatively simple piece of 
technology that measures the amount of power used, regardless 
of when during the day, week or year it is consumed. 
The company then multiplies total use by the unit cost of power to 
arrive at the dollar amount that goes on the electricity bill. When 
accumulation meters were the only type of metering technology 
available, this was the best way to charge for power. 
Accumulation meters remain the norm across most of Australia. 
Box 1 explains the four kinds of meters and why upgrading to 
smarter meters is important in the reform process.  
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 In Western Australia, this role is performed by the Economic Regulation 
Authority of Western Australia. 
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Box 1: Charging by the meter: simple and smart ways to 
measure power use 
Electricity meters are attached to each house to collect 
information about household power consumption. This 
information is used to calculate the customer’s bill. There are 
four main types of electricity meter: 
Accumulation meters are the oldest and simplest type. As 
electricity flows into a house, a counter inside the meter turns. 
Several times a year, a meter reader comes to the home and 
compares the counter reading to the reading from the previous 
period. Power companies then charge customers based on the 
volume of energy used over the billing period. 
Two rate meters work like accumulation meters, but contain 
two counters, which operate at different times. When the meter 
is read, both counter values are recorded and different prices 
apply for consumption at peak and off-peak times. These 
meters became necessary to support cheaper tariffs to 
encourage customers to run their hot water systems during the 
night. 
Interval meters record energy use during every half hour 
throughout the day. These meters give power companies 
greater flexibility to use tariffs that charge different rates at 
different times of day, and can measure a household’s 
maximum electricity use as well as total use over a given 
period. Households that install rooftop solar are typically 
required to have an interval meter to collect information on how 
much power was exported to the power network from the 
rooftop solar. 
 
 
Interval meters are a big step forward, yet they still have 
limitations. They must be programmed in advance and 
meter readers must still go to the home to record data. The 
manual reading process limits the range of sophisticated 
data management and tariffs than can be used. 
Smart meters combine the functions of an interval meter 
with a remote communications system. This means data 
can be extracted from the meter without visiting the house. 
Remote readings enable additional features. These include 
the possibility for tariffs that reflect real time changes in 
supply and demand for electricity, real time feedback about 
electricity usage, and remote control of high-use appliances 
during peak periods. 
Because most Victorian households had smart meters 
installed between 2009 and 2013, the broadest range of 
tariffs is already possible for customers in Victoria. 
In other states, households have a mix of accumulation, 
two-rate and interval meters. This means that tariff options 
are currently more limited outside Victoria. Chapter 4 
considers how tariffs could be improved in areas where 
smart meters are not currently available. 
 
 
 
Sources:  Victorian Government (2014a) 
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The system worked well in the days when most customers used 
electricity in largely similar ways, using similar home appliances. 
Demand varied across days, weeks and seasons, but the 
variation did not generally produce any severe imbalance in the 
amount each customer contributed to the cost of the network. 
But new technologies mean that different households are using 
the power system in different ways. In particular, the widespread 
installation of air conditioners and rooftop solar is transforming the 
way we use electricity. These technologies change the pattern of 
power demand: it becomes more subject to greater peaks and 
troughs. 
Peak demand is defined as the maximum amount of electricity 
used in a section of the power system at any point in time. If the 
network has insufficient capacity to meet peak demand, the 
system is likely to fail and cause blackouts. Blackouts are 
expensive and extremely unpopular with both businesses and 
households. For power companies, they cause reputational 
damage and may trigger financial penalties.  
Some blackouts are caused by factors that are beyond the control 
of network owners: damage as a result of storms or traffic 
accidents, for example. But outside these factors, the main risk of 
a blackout is a shortage of capacity at times of peak demand. 
Because it is not economically viable to store large quantities of 
electricity in power networks, the electricity network must be built 
with enough capacity to deliver power at any moment through the 
year as if it were a peak demand time. Box 2 describes peak 
demand in more detail. 
Peaks in the power network are like peak hour on roads and 
freeways. These times place greatest strain on the system and 
they determine how much is spent on it. The total amount of 
energy used is less important than the maximum being used at 
any one time. If peak demand can be reduced, network operators 
can spend less money to build and run the network, and thereby 
charge their customers less. 
In most Australian states, peak demand comes on a hot weekday 
evening in summer, when factories and businesses have not yet 
shut for the day, householders are switching on air conditioners 
and other appliances, and output from rooftop solar is low. (In 
Tasmania, milder summers and colder winters mean that peak 
demand usually occurs in winter, when many consumers are 
simultaneously running heaters.) 
When peak demand for electricity increases, new infrastructure 
must be built to carry enough power at peak times. So the cost of 
an additional unit of peak electricity consumption in the network is 
very high. The Productivity Commission has estimated the cost of 
each additional kilowatt of peak load on the power network to be 
between $240 and $310 a kilowatt.4 
Yet households do not pay more to use power at peak times than 
at other times. The result is that households have no financial 
incentive to use less power at peak times. As network businesses 
invest in ever more infrastructure to ensure they can cater for 
peak demand, all consumers pay through higher prices. 
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 Productivity Commission (2013) 
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Box 2: The Grand Final of electricity demand 
Think of the electricity network as like the Melbourne Cricket 
Ground. The MCG operators had to determine the capacity of 
the stadium – the maximum crowd it can hold. Then they had to 
build enough grandstands, seats, corporate boxes, entrances 
and toilets to cater for the maximum crowd. 
In the same way, owners of a power network have to make 
decisions about how much infrastructure - poles, wires, 
transformers and substations – they need to build to meet 
demand for electricity. The MCG only comes close to being 
filled a couple of times a year, usually at the AFL Grand Final 
and the Boxing Day cricket test. From a financial perspective, it 
is good for the operators to fill the stadium as often as possible. 
Empty seats represent money that has been invested in 
infrastructure that is not generating any revenue. 
For the networks, peak demand day is like Grand Final day – 
the day when all the capacity available in the system is most 
likely to get used. As with the MCG, much of the capacity in 
electricity networks is only used for a small part of the year.  
Yet network owners face a major problem that stadium owners 
do not. On AFL Grand Final day, the stadium operators can 
raise the price of tickets and restrict the total number of tickets 
on sale. But owners of the power network must build enough 
capacity to cater for all consumers who want to use it at all 
times. If they do not, the shortfall will cause blackouts and the 
network owner will face financial penalties. 
 
 
With existing electricity tariffs, most consumers pay the 
same price to use the electricity network, regardless of 
when they use it. This would be as if the MCG charged the 
same price per seat for every game and every event across 
the year, regardless of the demand for seats. Network tariff 
reform is about enabling network owners to adopt pricing 
strategies to help balance supply and demand. Otherwise, 
too much network capacity is likely to be built and all 
consumers have to pay the cost of installing ‘empty seats’ – 
capacity that is only needed for a few hours a year. 
 
 
Source:  Sheko (2010) 
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1.3 The problem with air conditioners and rooftop solar 
Increasing use of air conditioners in homes is a major driver of 
peak demand growth. Consider the case of a Victorian customer 
who purchases an air conditioner with a capacity rating of 
five kilowatts. The standard reverse cycle air conditioner has a 
capacity rating of between two and nine kilowatts.5 Table 1 shows 
the costs this air conditioner may add to the network, and what 
the owner might pay in extra network charges during peak times. 
This air conditioner could add between $1200 and $1550 to the 
cost of the network. Yet its owner would only pay an extra $53.40 
a year in network charges. Because the network businesses do 
not recover their costs through usage charges associated with 
using the air conditioner, they must recover these costs in other 
ways. The result is higher prices for all users. 
A similar situation may occur when households install rooftop 
solar. If peak demand occurs at a time when the sun is shining, 
then rooftop solar can help reduce peak demand. Yet in many 
areas, peak demand occurs in the evening when output from solar 
panels is low. 
Some households will pay substantially less to use the network 
after they install rooftop solar, since more of the network charge is 
based on the amount of energy the household requires from the 
network. Yet, if consumption at peak times remains the same, 
then the cost a household imposes on the network will not 
change. Again, other users must pay more to cover the gap. 
                                            
5
 Appliances Online (2014), figures based on 20 most purchased air 
conditioners. 
Table 1: The use of air conditioners during summer costs the 
network much more than many users pay 
Cost to power networks of using an air conditioner at peak times 
    Maximum capacity of the air conditioner 5kW 
    Cost per additional kW to distribution networks $150 to 220/ kW 
    Cost per additional kW to transmission networks $90/ kW 
 Total investment cost to power networks $1200 to $1550 
Network charges for using an air conditioner in summer 
    Maximum capacity of the air conditioner 5kW 
    Price per kWh of electricity paid to the network $0.10/ kWh 
    Average hours of summer air conditioner use 107 hours 
 Implied network cost to consumer $53.40/ year 
Note:  The ‘price per kWh of electricity paid to the network’ is the usage component of the 
network tariff. It excludes fixed charges and charges that relate to other parts of the power 
system, such as the price paid to retailers or power stations. 
Sources:  AEMC (2013a), Appliances Online (2014), Productivity Commission (2013), 
CitiPower Pty (2012) Jemena (2012) Powercor Australia Limited (2012), SP AusNet 
(2012), United Energy (2012), Roy Morgan (2008) 
In a network built and maintained to meet demand at peak times, 
the incremental investment cost to use the infrastructure at other 
times is very low. This is particularly striking because peak events 
occur so rarely. As Figure 4 shows, over the past three years, 
demand came within five per cent of the annual peak for an 
average of between six and 21 hours a year – less than 0.24 
per cent of the time. 
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Figure 4: Energy use approaches peak levels for only a few hours a 
year 
Hours per year 
 
Note:  Chart shows the average number of hours when demand came within five per cent 
of the annual peak, 2011-2013. Tasmania has more hours close to the peak than in other 
states as it has a winter peak - demand tends to be less volatile in winter than in summer. 
Source:  AEMO (2014a), AEMO (2014b), IMO (2014) 
This disparity between the costs of using the network at peak 
times, when the network is constrained, and off-peak times when 
there is spare capacity means that energy-based tariffs can be 
unfair. Customers who use a large portion of their electricity 
outside peak times may pay substantially more than their fair 
share, while other customers who use a lot of power during a 
peak demand period effectively receive a subsidy. 
Network tariffs that do not reflect the costs of peak demand can 
also add to the overall cost of the power system, which means 
that all consumers have to pay more. Over the past five years, 
when peak demand was forecast to rise substantially, network 
businesses invested heavily in new infrastructure. As a result, the 
regulator allowed them to collect more revenue in the form of 
electricity price increases. It is estimated that $7.8 billion of 
network investment over the past five years could have been 
avoided if customers faced better price signals at peak times.6 
1.4 Why should households pay a new power tariff? 
Households are not the only power consumers connected to 
major electricity networks. In fact, household electricity use 
accounts for just 20 to 30 per cent of power consumed. Yet at 
peak times, households consume significantly more power than 
they do at average times. Figure 5 shows that households 
consume between 30 and 50 per cent of total demand at peak 
times. This suggests there is substantial opportunity to reduce 
peak demand by improving the way households use power. 
The analysis in this report has specifically targeted household 
users, but the proposed reforms would also be suitable to apply to 
small businesses. Large commercial users often already pay 
power charges that reflect their maximum power use but, like 
households, small businesses’ network tariffs do not provide an 
incentive to reduce consumption at peak times. 
                                            
6
 This figure reflects potential savings in capital expenditure related to network 
growth. See Section 3.3 for further detail. 
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Figure 5: Households account for a higher share of energy use at 
times of peak demand 
Household share of use 
 
Note:  The figure shows the average household contribution to peak demand between 
2011 and 2013. Peaks are measured as the half hour intervals with maximum demand on 
days that fall within 5 per cent of the annual peak. 
Sources:  AEMO (2014a), AEMO (2014b), BREE (2013a), IMO (2014) 
Recent technological developments have created both a need 
and an opportunity to improve the way households pay for power. 
The need comes in part from the widespread adoption of air 
conditioning and rooftop solar (see Table 1). The opportunity 
comes from improvements in metering technology (see Box 1) 
and data management systems.  
The cost of metering and data processing used to be a major 
constraint on the types and amount of data collected from 
customers. This, in turn, narrowed the range of tariffs that could 
be charged. In recent years, the cost of these technologies has 
fallen substantially. While data processing and a roll out of smart 
meters would still be expensive, they make it possible for bills to 
be calculated far more precisely, based on a household’s 
maximum consumption level, geographic location in the network, 
or consumption at certain times of day or during peak demand 
periods. 
1.5 Why focus on network charges? 
Network tariffs are a significant part of total consumer charges. 
Higher peak demand means more spending on the network and 
higher network tariffs. 
Policy design often requires trade-offs between making a whole 
system more efficient and sacrificing a degree of efficiency to 
distribute costs more fairly. The beauty of network tariff redesign 
is that it can achieve both. It can share the cost of running 
networks more fairly among consumers, and at the same time 
help network owners to find cheaper solutions to network 
constraints, which will bring prices down in future. 
The approach proposed here does not impose a narrow formula 
for how reform must be carried out. Instead, it gives regulators 
and network businesses latitude to design tariffs that better reflect 
the cost pressures faced by network businesses and more fairly 
allocate costs among consumers.  
Reform of network tariffs will also give retailers a price signal – an 
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incentive to encourage customers to use the power network more 
efficiently. Retailers retain the ability to tailor products to suit 
customer preferences and to help customers to adjust to new tariff 
structures.  
In the short term, the reforms this report proposes will redistribute 
costs among households without changing the total cost of the 
network across all customers. Over the longer term, providing 
consumers with incentives to use the network more efficiently, 
especially at peak times, will save on the cost of building the 
network and reduce costs for all consumers. 
Fair pricing for power 
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2 A capacity tariff: a fairer way to pay
Domestic customers are currently billed for using the power 
network based on how much electricity they use over the billing 
period. This type of network tariff, calculated by multiplying the 
volume of use by the price of each unit of power, is both unfair on 
some customers and does not reflect the cost to distribution 
businesses of running the network. In fact, the average customer 
subsidising others pays around $150 too much for electricity each 
year. 
Instead of this tariff, households should pay a charge based on 
the amount of network capacity they use. That is, a charge that is 
based on their maximum energy use during the year.7 This tariff 
will lead to a more efficient network, and to lower, fairer prices. 
Across Australia, large commercial and industrial consumers 
already pay network tariffs that reflect the user’s maximum 
demand on the network. Households and small businesses 
should also pay tariffs that reflect their requirements for network 
capacity. 
A household’s maximum use is different from peak demand. Peak 
demand measures the highest level of consumption across all 
consumers in a network, while maximum use measures it for just 
one household. It is the individual household’s maximum use that 
forms the basis of a capacity charge. 
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 The capacity tariff modelled in this report is based on a households top five half 
hour intervals of energy use throughout the year. Energy use is only considered 
between 9am and 8pm on weekdays.  
2.1 How a capacity tariff would change the household bill 
Network charges make up about 43 per cent of the $1660 the 
average Australian household pays for power each year. The 
balance is made up of charges paid to power retailers, power 
generators and for compliance costs. Network charges consist of 
a standing charge – the fixed costs of running the network that 
range from about 6 to 24 per cent of the bill – and a usage 
component based on a customer’s consumption.8 
Under the new tariff, the usage component of a household’s 
network charge would be calculated based on its maximum 
capacity requirement; not its overall energy use. In other words, 
households would pay based on the period during the year when 
they use the most power. Compared to existing energy-based 
charges, this is a far better estimate of the household’s 
contribution to peak demand. Peak demand drives the costs of 
building and running the network, and therefore the prices that 
consumers pay. 
Figure 6 shows how a capacity charge captures households’ 
contribution to peak demand much more effectively than a charge 
based on total energy use. Using a flat rate energy charge, the 
share of network costs paid by each household has only a weak 
relationship with the household’s actual contribution to peak 
demand. Time-of-use tariffs are not much better. Yet, a capacity 
                                            
8
 The eastern and Mt Isa regions of Ergon energy’s business are exceptions. 
These regions apply a higher fixed charge, making up an average of 33 and 
47 per cent of the bill, respectively. 
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charge based on a household’s maximum energy use over a half 
hour interval between 9am and 8pm on weekdays has a strong 
relationship with the amount of energy the household is using at 
peak times.9 
A time-of-use tariff is based on total energy use, but the price of 
energy varies at different times of day, throughout the week, or in 
different seasons. This differs from a flat rate tariff, where the 
price per kilowatt hour is fixed throughout the year.10 Time-of-use 
tariffs are only marginally better than flat rate tariffs at reflecting 
the cost of household energy use at peak times. 
Capacity tariffs, however, are a significant improvement. Under a 
capacity tariff, a distribution business may continue to collect a 
portion of revenue through a fixed standing charge paid by each 
household. Yet, the portion of the network bill based on usage 
charges would be based on the customer’s maximum capacity 
requirement, measured in kilowatts. 
Box 3 provides an illustrative case study of how capacity charges 
could change the way that households share the cost of paying 
for the power network. 
                                            
9
 This analysis is based on Victorian data. The extent to which each tariff type 
‘explains’ the household’s cost to the network is measured by comparing the 
household’s actual contribution to peak demand with the size of the household’s 
expected annual bill under each tariff structure. The peak is measured as half 
hour intervals where demand was within 5 per cent of the absolute annual peak. 
The time-of-use tariff is based on the flexible pricing tariff offered in the Jemena 
network in Victoria. 
10
 The time-of-use tariff modelled in Figure 6 is based on the Victorian off-peak, 
shoulder and peak time periods, with prices based on the flexible pricing tariff 
option provided by the Jemena distribution business. 
Figure 6: Capacity tariffs reflect household contributions to peak 
demand better than energy-based tariffs in Victoria 
Household network peak costs reflected in each tariff type (%) 
Note:  Chart shows the level of correlation between users’ contributions to network peaks 
and their expected network bills based on a variety of network tariffs and historical energy 
use. The sample includes household customers in Victoria. 
Source:  Grattan Analysis based on Jemena (2012) and metering data provided by the 
Victorian Department of State Development and Innovation. 
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Box 3: How bills could change with a capacity tariff 
Table 2 shows how the introduction of a capacity charge would 
change the network component of bills accrued by two different 
households, which both use the same amount of energy but 
have different capacity requirements from the network. 
Table 2: How charging for network capacity could change 
household bills 
 
Household 
A 
Household 
B 
Energy based network tariff 
      Energy use 5000kWh 5000kWh 
      Network energy use charge 9c/kWh 9c/kWh 
  Network usage charge $450 $450 
  Network standing charge $150 $150 
  Non-network costs (generation, retail, etc) $900 $900 
Total bill $1,500 $1,500 
Capacity based network tariff 
      Maximum capacity 4kW 6kW 
      Network capacity use charge $90/kW $90/kW 
  Network usage charge $360 $540 
  Network standing charge $150 $150 
  Non-network costs (generation, retail, etc) $900 $900 
Total bill $1,410 $1,590 
Assume Households A and B both consume 5000 kilowatt hours of 
electricity a year and now pay $1500 a year each for electricity. Of 
this total retail bill, $600 is for network tariffs – a $450 energy 
charge and a $150 standing charge. 
 
 
Household B requires six kilowatts of capacity on the network 
to meet its maximum level of demand, whereas Household A 
only requires four kilowatts. So, while both households use 
the same amount of energy, it is likely that Household B 
would put more pressure on the network at peak times. 
Assume these two households are the only customers in the 
network. The $600 a year that each of the businesses are 
paying in network tariffs means the regulator has allowed the 
distribution business to recover a total of $1200 in revenue. 
Of this, $300 is paid through the standing charge. 
If the remaining $900 is recovered through a capacity charge, 
the households no longer share the cost evenly. 
Household A pays $90 less – a total capacity payment of 
$360 – and Household B pays $90 more, or $540. 
This reflects that Household B uses more network capacity. 
The extra $90 Household B will now pay will not increase 
company profits – rather, it is a saving to Household A. 
Before moving to a capacity charge, Household A was 
paying too much and subsidising Household B. 
Under the capacity charge, revenue collected by distribution 
business would not change in the short term. Savings would 
come over the medium term by reducing the need for new 
network infrastructure. Yet capacity charges would change 
the way network costs are shared among households. 
Note:  This example illustrates how network costs may be are allocated using 
different tariff structures. It does not show actual customer charges, or expected 
outcomes. 
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2.2 Should capacity charges vary by location?  
Network tariffs currently vary across network businesses, 
meaning that customers located in different distribution areas pay 
different prices. The prices they pay reflect the historical spending 
patterns of the network businesses, their operating costs, allowed 
rates of return and depreciation. 
However, within each distribution network area, all customers of 
the same type pay the same price.11 This can result in some 
customers paying higher prices to subsidise customers in other 
parts of the same network. 
This problem could be resolved by allowing distribution 
businesses to charge different rates within different regions of 
their distribution areas. One distribution business, Ergon Energy 
in Queensland, already does this. Ergon Energy has three 
regions; East, West and Mt Isa and applies different charges to 
customers in each region. 
Capacity charges would reflect network costs more accurately if 
network businesses charged households different prices based on 
their location.12 The benefits and costs of combining capacity 
tariffs and some form of locational pricing should be fully explored 
as part of the introduction of new pricing principles. 
                                            
11
 Wood, T., Carter, L., and Harrison, C. (2013), p24 
12
 Productivity Commission (2013) p438 
2.3 How more advanced meters will enable reform 
Introducing capacity-based tariffs would be much simpler if all 
Australian households had access to interval or smart meters that 
could record their maximum capacity. Yet while almost all 
Victorian homes have smart meters installed, most Australian 
homes do not. 
Interval meters are more widespread. Households with rooftop 
solar, which make up around one in ten Australian homes, 
typically have an interval meter or smart meter installed to 
measure the flow of electricity from the home onto the network.  
Until advanced meters are more widely installed, most customers 
would need to be charged based on their estimated maximum 
capacity.13 Yet they should have the option to acquire an 
advanced meter that would enable them to move to a tariff based 
on their actual energy use during the time period of maximum 
capacity, rather than an estimate. Consumers who use less 
electricity during times of high demand would have an incentive to 
take this option since it would lead to them paying lower bills.  
Over time, in order to save money, many consumers will choose 
to be billed based on their actual (rather than estimated) capacity. 
Those who continue to be billed on the estimated tariff will see 
their prices rise. This is because many of those who choose to be 
billed based on their actual use will be those who place less 
demand on the network and want to see that reflected in cheaper 
                                            
13
 The charge could be based on the Net System Load Profile of each network 
region. The Net System Load Profile of each network is the estimated energy 
consumption for each 30-minute interval of customers that do not have smart 
meters. 
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bills. They would leave behind a group that on average is placing 
greater strain on the network and would therefore pay more. This 
will give more customers paying the estimated tariff an incentive 
to move to an actual capacity tariff calculated by an interval or 
smart meter. In this way, new metering infrastructure could be 
rolled out to a growing number of customers who stand to gain.  
The switch from energy-based to capacity-based tariffs changes 
the incentives customers face. They will have a strong incentive to 
avoid using large amounts of power at any one time – by 
switching on many appliances at once, for example – because 
that risks increasing their maximum capacity and paying more. 
But outside the maximum capacity period, they will incur no 
additional charges for using the network, and can increase their 
power use without incurring further network costs.  
Consumers will not just be encouraged to reduce their capacity 
use through changing their behaviour. They will also have an 
incentive to use technologies that will save them money by 
reducing their maximum capacity. Many of these technologies, 
such as timers that allow dishwashers to run late at night, already 
exist.  
While the network component of a household’s bill would be 
based on capacity, a substantial part of the average household’s 
total bill will still be based on overall energy use. For example, the 
cost of buying power from power stations - about 40 per cent of a 
household’s bill – is likely to remain an energy-based charge.  
In the short run, capacity tariffs would mean that consumers who 
are now subsidising others have their electricity bills significantly 
reduced. Households that are using the network inefficiently 
would start to pay their fair share. 
Figure 6 shows how capacity tariffs are far more effective than 
energy-based tariffs at signalling to consumers the true cost of 
their network use. Figure 7 shows that, under existing energy-
based tariffs, many households are paying more than they should 
for using the network while many others are paying too little. 
Figure 7 also compares the spread of those households paying 
too much and too little through energy-based charges to what the 
same households would pay under a capacity-tariff in Victoria.14 In 
each case, the size of each household’s bill is compared to the 
household’s actual contribution to peak demand. With capacity 
tariffs, households will incur a network charge that is far more 
closely related to the costs they place on the network. 
To date, Australian households have not been exposed to 
capacity-based charges. Their introduction would require a 
significant effort to clearly explain to households how they are 
being charged for using the network and how they can respond to 
the new charges to lower their power bills. 
                                            
14
 Care should be taken when extrapolating these results. The Victorian dataset 
used for this analysis was collected as part of an opt-in survey, suggesting the 
sample may have been skewed by customers who are more actively engaged 
with their power use than those who chose not to participate. Additionally, 
differences in climate, demographics and other factors mean that caution should 
be taken when applying results to other states. These results do not reflect 
behavioural changes that could occur as a result of introducing capacity charges. 
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Figure 7: How energy and capacity tariffs compare to the true cost 
of using the network 
$ per annum 
 
Note:  The five groups represented in this figure are divided up based on the households’ 
contribution to peak demand. 
Source:  Grattan Analysis based on Jemena (2012) and metering data provided by the 
Victorian Department of State Development and Innovation. 
Over time, households paying capacity tariffs are likely to become 
increasingly aware of their maximum energy use and the patterns 
of energy use that increase their capacity requirements. At least  
some households will change their behaviour as a result, leading 
to lower levels of peak electricity demand and lower prices. 
2.4 Political and institutional challenges 
Pricing use of the network based on capacity, not energy, is not a 
new idea. The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) is 
currently charged by the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) Energy Council to implement a rule change request that 
establishes the framework for more cost reflective pricing.15 The 
Productivity Commission has recommended that tariffs should 
better reflect the cost of running the network and therefore should 
be based on network peak periods.16 In a report for the Energy 
Supply Association of Australia, the peak body for the stationary 
energy sector, Deloitte Access Economics found that “capacity 
tariffs are consistently the strongest performing tariffs in terms of 
cost reflectivity”.17 
The move to capacity-based network tariffs will allocate costs 
more fairly among customers and lead to lower costs overall. But 
it confronts politicians with a challenge because in the short term 
it will remove the implicit subsidy that some customers are 
receiving. Figure 8 uses a sample of Victorian power users to 
show how removing the unfair subsidy might affect consumers. 
The proposed reforms will make many customers better off. Yet 
customers tend to value losses more highly than they value 
gains.18 That means the customers losing the subsidy are far 
more likely to be vocal opponents of change than winners will be 
in supporting the measures. 
                                            
15
 AEMC (2013c) 
16
 Productivity Commission (2013)  
17
 Deloitte (2014) 
18
 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
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Figure 8: Households currently subsidising others will pay less 
and other households will pay more under a capacity charge 
Proportion of households 
 
Note:  This analysis does not take into account behavioural changes. Households are likely 
to respond to both higher and lower prices that result from the proposed reforms. In 
general terms, this will tend to reduce the size of both savings and costs to households. 
Source:  Grattan Analysis based on Jemena (2012) and metering data provided by the 
Victorian Department of State Development and Innovation. 
Governments should anticipate resistance to the proposed 
changes from customers who benefit from the unfair status quo. 
Policymakers will need to explain how the proposed changes 
would make the power system more efficient and cheaper in the 
long run. They should be prepared to stand up for the customers 
forced to pay cross-subsidies through the existing system. 
Policymakers should also recognise that some consumers would 
find it harder to cope with a sharp price increase, even if it were 
justified. Ideally, all customers would move to capacity-based 
charges as soon as possible. Yet, some compromises may be 
needed to accommodate low income and vulnerable households. 
The Productivity Commission and the South Australian Council of 
Social Service have noted that many low-income households 
have lower levels of use at times of peak demand. Introducing 
pricing structures that better reflected the costs users place on the 
system would see average bills for most of these households fall 
by 10 to 20 per cent.19 Nevertheless these reforms would 
negatively affect some low-income households. This is not a 
reason to give up on reform but highlights the need for well-
targeted concessions to help these households adjust to change.  
Finally, policymakers and businesses should emphasise the fact 
that the proposed reforms will not increase the revenues of 
distribution businesses. All of the short-term losses some 
customers face will go towards reducing the bills of other 
customers who use the network more efficiently. 
                                            
19
 Productivity Commission (2013), SACOSS (2012) 
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3 Critical peak pricing can deliver cheaper power 
This chapter explains the concept of critical peak pricing, and how 
it should be used to help prevent unnecessary expansion of 
infrastructure in power networks in specific locations. If 
infrastructure costs can be kept down, prices will also fall.  
The previous chapter described how power prices would be fairer 
if customers were charged based on the maximum capacity they 
require from the power network, rather than on the energy they 
use. Tariffs based on a household’s maximum power use far 
better reflect the costs the customer is likely to put on the network 
at peak times than do tariffs based on energy use. 
Yet, there are some circumstances where capacity tariffs do not 
do enough to reduce peak demand. A more targeted approach is 
warranted in locations where a network has, or is expected to 
have, a shortage of capacity to meet future peak demand, and 
where reducing this peak demand could remove or delay the need 
to build more assets. This method of charging higher prices for 
short periods when demand for power is high is known as critical 
peak pricing. 
3.1 A role for critical peak pricing in some places 
During a peak demand period, households use a larger share of 
electricity than at other times. This is because many households 
are simultaneously using more electricity than usual. Yet not all of 
these users will have their maximum capacity requirement during 
the peak. In fact, while peak demand in most states occurs in 
summer, many households have their highest demand for 
capacity in winter, as Figure 9 shows.20 
With a capacity charge, a large portion of each household’s 
network bill is based on its maximum capacity requirement. This 
means that, so long as the user does not exceed the maximum 
capacity level set in the previous year, the cost of using more 
power will be lower. Where peak demand occurs in summer but 
the household uses maximum capacity in winter, this could mean 
households have an incentive to use more power, not less, at 
peak times. 
In areas of the network that are not under strain this is not a 
problem. Capacity tariffs would more fairly allocate the cost of 
paying for the network without adverse effects. 
Yet in areas of the network that are under pressure, capacity 
tariffs alone are unlikely to be sufficient. A supplementary pricing 
structure that raises prices during periods of peak demand may 
bring real benefits.  
Under a critical peak price (CPP) tariff, customers are told in 
advance of an imminent peak demand event that will trigger a 
period of high prices. During this period, customers will pay a 
substantially higher price to use the network – the retail power 
price will increase to between three and eight times the standard 
flat rate tariff. In exchange, they pay lower prices at other times 
through a rebate linked to the household’s capacity charge. 
                                            
20
 In Tasmania, peak demand typically occurs in winter. Historically, peak 
demand in New South Wales has also occurred in winter in some years. 
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Figure 9: Why capacity charges are not always enough: the 
mismatch between maximum household use and peak demand 
Hours                                                                                            Per cent 
 
Note:  Average hours within 10 per cent of peak demand are based on the average 
between 2009 and 2013. All data are for Victoria. 
Sources:  AEMO (2014a), Victorian Government (2014b) 
Critical peak pricing will reduce prices over time by reducing the 
amount that needs to be spent to build the power network. 
Properly designed, it has three main attractions: 
• It provides a strong incentive to customers to reduce their 
consumption during peak periods, but does not increase the 
amount of revenue collected from customers overall. 
• It only imposes a high price for around 30 to 40 hours on up to 
15 days a year - at times when lowering energy use is most 
critical to the network. By contrast, time-of-use tariffs typically 
have a peak period of at least three hours every weekday – a 
total of 780 hours a year. 
• Finally, not all customers need to pay the CPP price, only 
those in areas where introducing CPP could avoid the need to 
spend more on the network. 
3.2 How critical peak pricing would work 
CPP tariffs charge customers high prices during periods of peak 
demand in order to encourage them to use less power at those 
times. The goal is to reduce demand at peak times, which will 
reduce the need for infrastructure investment. Over time, this will 
lower network prices. 
Good design can help CPP tariffs do this in a way that balances 
the needs of the network against customers’ need for relatively 
stable and transparent prices. This is vital to win customers’ 
support for introducing CPP and to enable customers to change 
their power use in order to save money. 
First, the only customers to pay a CPP tariff would be located in 
areas that would otherwise require upgrades to the network and 
where implementing CPP would be cheaper than the required 
upgrade. If a subsequent investment in the network removed the 
capacity constraint in an area, the CPP tariff would no longer be 
required and would be removed. 
Second, the tariff would be set so that the price customers paid 
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during peak times was offset by lower prices at other times. 
Customers on a CPP tariff would receive a small daily rebate on 
most days of the year, which would be determined based on the 
user’s maximum capacity. Customers on the CPP tariff would 
then pay significantly higher prices for energy during a small 
number of CPP events each year.  
So while customers who used large amounts of electricity at peak 
times would pay more, customers who used less at peak times 
could pay a lower bill. Since distribution businesses would charge 
the tariff, the regulator would ensure that they did not earn extra 
revenue as a result of the CPP. 
To protect consumers and retailers, there would be a maximum 
number of CPP hours that could be called each year. As Figure 4 
shows (see section 1.3), electricity came within five per cent of the 
annual peak demand for an average of just four to 21 hours a 
year between 2011 and 2013. 
It is proposed that network businesses should be allowed to call 
for CPP periods for between 30 and 40 hours per year. The 
number of hours of CPP allowed per year should be as narrow as 
is practical to limit the amount of time that customers are exposed 
to high prices. Yet it should allow some margin to account for the 
fact that networks must predict peaks in advance, that the timing 
of peaks may be different at different locations, and that the 
number of peak hours varies widely between years. 
Similarly, to reduce the effect on customers the number of days 
on which peak demand events could be called in a given year 
should be limited. 
Figure 10: Why CPP events will be rare 
Number of days 
Source:  AEMO (2014a), AEMO (2014b), IMO (2014) 
As Figure 10 shows, confining CPP periods to a maximum of 
15 days per year would limit the number of days in which 
customers would be exposed by high prices, but would still 
typically allow network businesses to target enough days to 
significantly lower the annual peak. 
In years where peak demand is relatively low, there is a higher 
chance that more days will come close to this annual peak 
demand level. In these years, lower peak demand means less 
strain on network infrastructure, and therefore capturing all 
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periods of peak demand is less critical. 
Power companies at all levels of the supply chain devote 
substantial resources to tracking electricity demand. This is critical 
over the shorter term for making sure the system operates 
reliably, and over the longer term for infrastructure planning. 
As a consequence, businesses generally know in advance when 
peak demand events are likely to occur. Reliable weather 
forecasts are available a day or more beforehand. Under a CPP 
tariff, distribution businesses would notify retailers at least a day in 
advance that a CPP event would occur. It would also specify a 
block of time – from 2pm to 6pm, for example – when the CPP 
price would apply. 
The CPP would be imposed on retailers based on their 
customers’ use of the network during peak times. Retailers would 
be responsible for notifying their customers about CPP events 
and for structuring their prices to collect the CPP tariffs from 
customers. 
Retailers in deregulated markets would not be obliged to pass on 
the CPP tariff directly to consumers – though it is expected that 
many would do so to avoid the risk of their revenue not matching 
the payments they owed to network businesses. Yet some 
retailers could choose to manage this risk in other ways. Box 4 
discusses some of the approaches retailers could take to give 
customers choice about how to manage CPP events. 
3.3 Why CPP brings savings to the network 
The key to the effectiveness of CPP lies in deciding how much to 
charge customers at peak times. Network businesses must 
assess the extent to which customers are likely to respond to this 
price signal by changing their behaviour. This response is critical 
to deciding whether to delay or cancel a decision to build new 
infrastructure. 
A 2009 study compiled results from 28 pricing studies conducted 
around the world.21 The study considered a range of pricing 
structures, including time-of-use tariffs, critical peak pricing trials 
and peak time rebate programs.22 For each pricing structure, 
Figure 11 shows the average peak demand reduction from 
replacing energy-based tariffs with an alternative pricing structure. 
The study also separately assessed trials where customers were 
given some type of technology to help manage their power use. 
These results show the potential for CPP to significantly reduce 
peak demand. The average reduction in peak demand in trials 
featuring CPP was 17 per cent. Access to technology to assist in 
managing the peak load increased the average reduction to 
36 per cent. 
                                            
21
 Faruqui and Sergici (2009) 
22
 Peak time rebates are similar to CPP tariffs, but rather than receiving a higher 
bill during peak times, customers receive a discount for reducing their use from 
some baseline level at peak times.  
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Box 4:  What new tariffs would mean for retailers and 
customers 
This report proposes a number of reforms to the way 
distribution businesses charge for power. These reforms would 
change the way retailers pay network businesses for using the 
power system. Retailers would not have to pass these new 
charge structures on to customers, but many probably will. It is 
risky not to pass on network prices; retailers might not collect 
enough revenue to pay for network tariffs, and would have to 
make up the difference from their profits. 
Even so, some retailers may choose to operate differently. 
Unlike network businesses, retailers exist in a competitive 
market and could create new products or pricing structures to 
appeal to certain customers. There are two ways main ways 
they could do this. 
First, retailers could charge customers using a different price 
structure from the way they pay networks. For example, a 
retailer could decide not to pass on critical peak pricing tariffs 
and instead charge customers a slightly higher rate throughout 
the year 
Some customers could choose this tariff to be saved from worry 
about power use on CPP days. Yet, these customers are 
unlikely to save money. Retailers would charge extra to cover 
the risk of not collecting enough revenue to cover their costs to 
networks. Plus it is likely that customers with low use at CPP 
times would prefer to pay the critical peak price, so retailers 
would need to charge a high premium to cover the cost. 
 
 
Second, the retailer or another company could introduce 
new technology products to help customers manage their 
electricity use. Some of these products are already 
becoming available. From 2015, all new Australian air 
conditioners must have the ability to be fitted with a remote 
control system. Households will not be obliged to use this 
feature, but some may choose to – possibly to help reduce 
their use during a critical peak pricing period. 
Another example is customers using battery storage to 
reduce their maximum capacity requirement. For example, 
Bosch, a German industrial equipment maker, sells a 
household power storage system that stores energy from 
rooftop solar and automatically switches between drawing 
power from the network and using batteries when stored 
energy is available. 
Currently, this storage system is expensive, with prices for a 
small unit starting from around $20,000 – but storage costs 
are falling. Tariffs that charge customers higher prices 
during peak times would provide more incentive to invest in 
technology to help reduce consumption for those few critical 
peak hours per year. 
 
 
 
Sources:  Bosch (2014), Wilkenfeld, G. (2014) 
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Figure 11: Critical peak pricing encourages customers to change 
their behaviour 
Reduction in energy use at peak times from different tariff types 
Note:  Figure shows the average reduction in peak demand for each tariff type. These 
figures collate the results of 28 pricing studies conducted worldwide.  
Source:  Faruqui, A and Sergici, S. (2009) 
Critical peak pricing trials in Australia have produced results 
consistent with these international studies. For example, separate 
pricing trials conducted by three New South Wales distribution 
businesses, Ausgrid, Essential Energy and Endeavour Energy, 
tested customers’ responses to critical peak pricing. 
In each of these trials, customers had a critical peak price and 
access to information about their power use through either an in-
home display unit, or via the internet. The average reduction in 
peak demand in these trials ranged from 23 per cent to 35 per 
cent.23 
The CPP price for many of the trials was set at between three and 
eight times the standard retail energy tariff. For the average 
Australian customer paying 30 cents a kilowatt hour, this suggests 
that the retail electricity price during peak times would need to 
increase to between 90 cents and $2.40 a kilowatt hour to reduce 
peak demand by 17 per cent or more. This would mean the 
network charge would need to increase from 12 cents a kilowatt 
hour to between 70 cents and $2.20 a kilowatt hour. 
Yet if this CPP design were adopted, it does not mean that 
customers, overall, would pay more for using the power network. 
The design of the tariff means that all of the revenue collected 
through the critical peak prices would need to be paid back to 
customers through a daily rebate. As with capacity charges, users 
that put less strain on the system would actually pay lower bills. 
Between 2009 and 2013, around $42.8 billion was invested in 
Australia’s major power networks. Of this, $17.6 billion was spent 
on growing the size of the network.24 Figure 12 shows a five-year 
forecast of peak demand growth from 2009 to 2013 set against 
the actual investment in network growth over the same period.  
                                            
23
 Futura (2011) 
24
 CitiPower Pty (2012) Jemena (2012) Powercor Australia Limited (2012), SP 
AusNet (2012), United Energy (2012), Aurora Energy (2013), SA Power 
Networks (2013), Horizon Power (2014), Western Power (2013), Ergon Energy 
(2013), Energex (2013), Essential Energy (2012), Endeavour Energy (2013), 
Ausgrid (2013b), AEMO (2012). 
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With critical peak pricing, households’ demand for electricity 
during peak times would have been lower. Given that households 
make up a large share of network demand at peak times, this 
could have led to significantly lower forecasts of peak demand in 
each state. 
If CPP resulted in a 17 per cent reduction in household demand at 
peak times, CPP could have led to $7.8 billion less investment to 
meet peak demand over the past 5 years. 25 
As it turned out, peak demand did not rise as rapidly as forecast, 
while overall consumption has fallen. So infrastructure is not fully 
utilised, and too much has been spent. For a while the new spare 
capacity may enable the network to cope with any increases in 
peak demand. Yet as assets depreciate, or if peak demand levels 
start growing again in some locations, more investment will 
inevitably be required. Critical peak pricing is an important tool to 
prevent this investment from becoming excessive in future. 
                                            
25
 Most of trials in Faruqui and Sergici (2009) involved volunteers. These 
customers may be more engaged or more informed about pricing structures than 
the general population, which could potentially inflate the customers response to 
peak prices. However, other trials, particularly those combining CPP with 
technology, produced much larger reductions in peak demand. Australian trials 
using critical peak pricing resulted in average peak demand reductions of 23 to 
35 per cent.  
Figure 12: How peak demand forecasts (right or wrong) drive 
infrastructure spending  
$ million MW 
Note:  Chart shows forecast peak demand growth between 2009 and 2013, as predicted 
by AEMO in 2009. These figures are compared with actual capital expenditure on growth 
over the same period. Peak demand forecasts are an important consideration in planning 
network growth 
Source:  CitiPower Pty (2012) Jemena (2012) Powercor Australia Limited (2012), SP 
AusNet (2012), United Energy (2012), Aurora Energy (2013), SA Power Networks (2013), 
Horizon Power (2014), Western Power (2013), Ergon Energy (2013), Energex (2013), 
Essential Energy (2012), Endeavour Energy (2013), Ausgrid (2013b).  
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3.4 How to implement CPP 
Changes to the National Electricity Rules made by the Australian 
Energy Market Commission in October 2012 require distribution 
businesses to carry out an annual planning review that covers at 
least the next five years.26 They also oblige the businesses to 
assess “non-network” options as an alternative to building more 
assets, when these assets would cost $5 million or more. Critical 
peak pricing should be considered among these non-network 
options. Network planning and tariff design would then 
complement each other in delivering the best outcomes. 
The regulator should be flexible in allowing CPP projects outside 
the planning framework described above. In some cases, the five-
year planning process may provide insufficient time to roll out new 
infrastructure, to introduce new pricing structures, or to ensure 
that the response from customers has been adequate to defer 
investment in new assets. In addition, critical peak pricing could 
be introduced to avoid new investment projects with a value below 
$5 million. 
Critical peak pricing should also be considered in areas where 
there is no need to grow the network, but where existing assets 
require replacement. In this case, CPP could be used to avoid or 
defer investment, or to replace large pieces of infrastructure with 
smaller systems in areas where peak demand is falling. 
In each case, the use of CPP would be limited to situations where 
the distribution business can show that the area where the tariff is 
being introduced faces an imminent network constraint. 
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In some areas of Australia, introducing CPP would require the 
installation of smart meters that can measure household power 
consumption during peak periods. Where metering infrastructure 
is not already available, the cost of such infrastructure could be 
built into the cost-benefit analysis of whether CPP is a suitable 
alternative to more capital investment. 
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4 How to implement tariff reform 
This report analyses the structure of network tariffs and 
recommends reforms to make them cheaper and fairer. While it is 
businesses that will ultimately need to reform tariff structures, 
politicians and regulators have a vital role in introducing 
frameworks and incentives and removing barriers to change. 
The present state of the power sector in Australia gives them both 
a need and an opportunity to do so. Rising electricity prices, five 
years of falling electricity use, and the spread of technologies 
such as smart meters, batteries and smart appliances are 
changing the way we consume power. Yet designing better tariffs 
is only part of the story; reform will only succeed if its advantages 
can be communicated and consumers are engaged in the 
process. 
In the past two years a number of high-level reviews have made a 
strong case for reform to network tariffs. The COAG Energy 
Council of Commonwealth, state and territory energy ministers 
noted in December 2013 that the prices customers pay for the 
network do not necessarily align with the cost of producing 
power.27 
The Australian Energy Market Commission, the independent rule 
maker for energy markets, observed in November 2012 that: 
“The way in which network tariffs and retail pricing offers are 
currently structured means that individual consumers are not 
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always faced with final prices which accurately reflect the 
actual costs of supply and delivery of their electricity.”28 
And the Productivity Commission wrote in 2013 that: 
“under current pricing approaches, households and many 
businesses are not exposed to the much higher costs of 
supplying electricity during critical peak periods.”29 
These reviews have pointed directly at the problem. This report 
has sought to provide a solution. 
This chapter identifies the actions that need to be driven by the 
COAG Energy Council and implemented through the AEMC and 
the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). The AEMC is already 
well-advanced with establishing the framework for more cost-
reflective network pricing. The AEMC is also working to establish 
a competitive market for providing metering services – a critical 
reform to encourage the deployment of smarter meters.30 
4.1 What has to be done? 
Earlier chapters have made two key recommendations. Capacity 
charges for all households should replace flat rate and time-of-use 
energy network tariffs. Where interval or smart metering is not 
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available, distribution businesses would estimate a household’s 
capacity from its energy use and the average household pattern 
of power use across all homes. Where advanced meters are 
available, distributors should charge customers based on the 
household’s maximum power consumption over the preceding 
12 months. 
When customers request it, distribution businesses should be 
required to supply an interval or smart meter to enable billing 
based on actual maximum usage. The meter should be supplied 
at a reasonable cost that reflects the benefits of interval metering 
to both the customer and the power system.31 
The AER should explicitly require businesses to consider critical 
peak pricing as a non-network alternative to building or replacing 
more costly assets. Prices should be structured to ensure that all 
revenue collected through CPP is returned to customers through 
rebates, with the size of the rebate based on the customer’s 
maximum capacity. 
The COAG Energy Council should make reform of network tariffs 
a priority. This would explicitly reflect earlier agreement to amend 
pricing principles to encourage more efficient network pricing. 
Having endorsed the AEMC’s recommendation in this regard, the 
COAG Energy Council should make sure it is implemented and 
evaluate its success 32  
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The current regulations allow network businesses considerable 
flexibility in setting tariff structures. This is because the 
businesses have access to greater amounts of detail on the size 
and specific consumption patterns of customers and on the 
available capacity and limitations of the network. The AER is 
primarily concerned with the overall revenue outcome. 
This report recommends that distribution businesses adopt 
capacity charges for all customers and critical peak prices in 
areas where the cost is lower than the potential benefit. The AER 
should consider these pricing principles when reviewing network 
businesses’ annual pricing proposals and when assessing the 
Pricing Structures Statements that businesses would be required 
to submit under changes proposed by the COAG Energy 
Council.33 
4.2 Gaining support for fairer pricing 
In the short term, these reforms will produce tariffs that share the 
cost of the power network more fairly between consumers. In the 
longer term, the reforms will reduce the need for new 
infrastructure and bring down prices through reducing the cost to 
build the network. 
For consumers who do not use a lot of power at peak times, and 
who therefore impose lower costs on the network, the proposed 
reforms could immediately reduce their power bills. But some 
consumers who have relatively high peak usage are currently 
receiving an implicit subsidy, paid for by other users. These 
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customers will start to pay their fair share when these subsidies 
are removed. 
For the reforms to succeed, their purpose and consequences 
must be clearly communicated. Consumers will need to 
understand why reforms are required and how the change in 
tariffs will benefit all users over time.  
Governments, businesses and regulators will need to be clear that 
the total amount of revenue collected by network businesses is 
not increasing as a result of the changes; that higher bills for 
some customers will be offset by lower bills for others. 
Policymakers should consult with welfare agencies to examine 
how tariff changes may affect vulnerable consumers.34 It is 
important to recognise that, in many cases, vulnerable customers 
are among those paying too much for power to subsidise other 
users. Yet, in cases where evidence shows some vulnerable 
customers will face substantial bill increases, transition or support 
measures should be provided. Such measures are important to 
protect these users. They will also reduce the risk that negative 
consumer reactions could pressure decision makers to abandon 
or delay reform. 
While some transitionary or support measures may be necessary, 
it should be recognised that the proposed reforms will make tariffs 
cheaper for all consumers and allocate costs among them in a 
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 Work undertaken by Deloitte Access Economics for the Victorian Department 
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examines the impact of time-of-use pricing. See Deloitte (2012) 
fairer way. It is therefore important that additional welfare 
measures, where necessary, should complement these goals.  
Specifically, support measures that remove the price signal for 
consumers to use less power at peak times should be avoided. 
Measures such as support to replace inefficient appliances or 
providing direct financial payments could be structured to limit 
cost increases to vulnerable customers, while retaining the 
incentive to reduce consumption at peak times. 
Consumers’ response to the reforms is critical to their success. 
Box 5 shows how an attempt by a Victorian distribution business 
to make use of the state’s smart meters triggered a consumer 
backlash that stalled the reform process. Following public 
criticism, the Victorian Government imposed a moratorium on the 
introduction of new tariffs in March 2010, and did not lift it until 
September 2013.35 
This report proposes pricing structures that give consumers 
choices that will allow them to save money. For example, 
customers being billed for capacity based on the average user’s 
energy profile will be able to install an interval meter if they 
believe their consumption is more efficient than the average. 
Households with critical peak pricing will receive a discount on 
their power bills if they reduce their consumption at peak times, or 
may pay more if they opt for the convenience of using more power 
at these times. Either way, customers will end up paying tariffs 
that best reflect the choices they make in the way they use 
electricity. 
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Box 5: Policymakers must keep customers satisfied 
In early 2010, a public debate erupted when SP Ausnet, a 
Victorian electricity distribution business, proposed a new 
household tariff structure. The flat rate tariff charged $6.20 a 
year for connection, and 7.6 cents a kilowatt hour for energy, or 
8.1 cents for use in excess of 1020 kilowatt hours per quarter. 
The new tariff increased the price for power during certain peak 
times on weekday afternoons in summer and winter. These 
rates were between 30.6 cents and 38.2 cents per kilowatt hour 
– a significant increase on the previous charges. Yet at other 
times electricity was much cheaper: only 2.6 cents a kilowatt 
hour. 
The new tariff would have saved the average Victorian 
households an average of $38 a year – more than 10 per cent 
off the network bill. Yet public discussion focused only on the 
peak prices. The ABC reported that: 
The Victorian Energy Minister, Peter Batchelor, says the 
price rise sought by SP AusNet is excessive. 
In March 2010, the State Government introduced a moratorium 
on time-of-use pricing, which remained in place until September 
2013. Victorians spent $1.8 billion to install smart meters on 
every home, but it would be two and a half years before 
businesses would be allowed to use them for most customers. 
This example serves to highlight how important customer support 
is to the introduction of new tariff structures. Despite the fact that 
most customers would have been better off with the new tariffs, 
 
 
a lack of information, poor communications and a lack of 
analysis on how the changes would affect vulnerable 
customers produced a major delay to the tariff reform 
process.  
Comparison of flat and interval network tariff costs for an 
average SP Ausnet residential customer in 2010 
$/ per year 
 
Sources:  AEMO (2014b), SP AusNet (2012), Grattan Analysis of household 
power consumption by state. 
 
Sources:  ABC (2010), Metering.com (2010), Origin Energy (2013), 
Victoria Government (2014a). 
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The introduction of a capacity-based tariff is not designed to 
change the earnings of network businesses but rather redistribute 
revenue across consumers with different usage patterns. 
Critical peak pricing seeks to ensure more efficient future network 
investment, and hence lower prices for customers. When 
distribution businesses build more assets they are permitted to 
collect more revenue from customers. So, less investment means 
less future profit for networks. Yet, because the networks also 
avoid building assets, CPP will not lower the rate of return that 
networks earn on existing assets. 
In contrast, excessive investment in network assets raises the risk 
that future governments or regulators could move to write down 
the value of existing network assets. This could materially reduce 
network owners’ rates of return. Businesses therefore have at 
least some incentive to encourage efficient investment. 
4.3 Specific stakeholders can help create change  
The COAG Energy Council should set targets and monitor the 
achievement of these targets. It should ensure that success is 
measured as the achievement of outcomes such as changes in 
peak demand, changes in household bills and adoption of cost 
reflective tariffs - and not as a set of agreed actions with no 
consideration of outcomes.  
State and Territory governments and their agencies must take a 
lead in communicating the benefits of the proposed pricing 
reforms to their electorates. The removal of remaining retail price 
regulation must also be a priority. 
The AEMC has taken a strong leadership role in its 2012 Power of 
Choice report and in recommending rule changes that facilitate 
more cost-reflective network pricing.36 The role of the AER will be 
critical to deliver the benefits of network tariff reform and ensure 
they are not outweighed by associated costs. The COAG Energy 
Council should monitor the performance of the AEMC in making 
rule changes and the AER in enforcing them. 
Across the National Electricity Market, distribution network 
businesses have trialled a number of approaches to tariff reform, 
generally on their own initiative. They have also developed, 
trialled and promoted other innovations such as direct load 
control, in which devices are used to remotely switch off an 
appliance for short periods during peak demand times or to help 
consumers manage their maximum use by switching appliances 
on at off-peak times. 
The recommended network tariff reforms are not intended to hurt 
the profitability of distribution businesses, but rather to provide 
incentives for them to invest in infrastructure in the long-term 
interests of consumers. The risk to distribution businesses of 
future loss of revenue, including having to write down the value of 
their infrastructure if network prices become uncompetitive with 
off-grid alternatives,37 should provide an underlying incentive to 
secure their support for efficient reforms. 
Over time, network businesses are likely to profit from innovations 
such as advanced metering, distributed generation, electricity 
storage and direct load control with smarter appliances. 
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Regulatory reforms should encourage, not hinder, such 
opportunities. 
Retailers have a direct relationship with electricity consumers. The 
introduction of the network tariff reforms described in this report 
and the opportunity to adopt smart meters and benefit from the 
greater information base that they provide, will give retailers the 
opportunity to offer a wider range of services to customers. While 
retailers can be expected to take up this opportunity, adoption 
rates and their results should be monitored and any barriers 
addressed. 
Welfare organisations will be concerned to ensure that fairer and 
lower prices do not lead to unintended adverse impacts on their 
constituents, particularly low-income households and other 
vulnerable consumers. It will be vital that such consumers 
understand the benefit of reducing their consumption at peak 
times and adopting tariffs that deliver such benefits. It may also be 
necessary to review existing mechanisms that support vulnerable 
consumers to ensure these mechanisms continue to play that role 
under a new tariff structure.  
The price of electricity has risen substantially every year in recent 
years, even as consumption falls. Network tariff reform has the 
potential to help prevent such large rises in future and remove 
unfairness among customers. The poor history of the mandatory 
smart meter rollout in Victoria, and the general tendency of 
consumers to put a low value on uncertain benefits against the 
prospect of certain costs,38 mean that governments and their 
                                            
38
 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
agencies, NGOs and retailers, will have to clearly communicate 
the reasons for the changes and their benefits. 
The interests of power generators, which produce the electricity 
that is transported through the networks, should also be 
considered when proposing major reform to the way customers 
use electricity. Like network businesses, generators must build 
enough infrastructure - power stations, in this case - to supply the 
power system at times of peak demand.  
Over recent years, as peak demand has increased relative to 
average demand, gas-fired generation plants have been built to 
provide a faster response to changes in overall demand. Gas 
generators have the advantage that they can be switched on and 
off more quickly than coal-fired power stations. The introduction of 
more wind power, driven by Renewable Energy Target, has 
changed the nature and mix of the electricity supply system. 
Falling demand for electricity has resulted in lower wholesale 
electricity prices, putting financial pressure on power stations. 
Changes to tariffs are likely to further change the way power is 
consumed and supplied. While tariff reform should not give undue 
consideration to the commercial interests of power generators, 
regulatory changes and reversals of government positions can 
deter investment. Retailers may also combine CPP for networks 
with some element of similar pricing to reflect higher generation 
costs at critical peak times. Therefore major changes to the 
framework for network tariff design should be clearly flagged so 
that power generators can adapt their strategies accordingly. 
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4.4 Addressing barriers to implementation 
Tariff reform will need to overcome a number of structural 
barriers. These include existing limits on retail price competition, 
the unsophisticated nature of Australia’s electricity meters, and 
consumer inertia.  
4.4.1 Retail price regulation 
In 2004, the Council of Australian Governments committed to 
deregulation of retail energy prices. Under the Australian Energy 
Market Agreement, retail price regulations would be removed in 
each jurisdiction once it was shown that effective retail price 
competition existed.39 Because not all states have made this 
transition, the method of setting retail tariffs varies among states.  
In Victoria and South Australia, the retail market is fully 
deregulated, and regulators are not required to approve the price 
that retailers charge customers or the form tariffs must take. 
Competition between retailers is assumed to be a sufficient 
control on prices.  
Retail price deregulation has been introduced in New South 
Wales from 1 July 2014. Residential customers in the Australian 
Capital Territory, Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania 
are still able to choose between a retail tariff set by the regulator 
and competitive offers from retailers. That is, retailers may 
compete for customers by offering discounts on the regulated 
tariff. The regulated prices aim to ensure that, regardless of the 
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level of competition, all customers can obtain prices for electricity 
and gas that the regulator considers reasonable.40 
The reforms this report recommends will provide the best results 
for consumers and the supply sector if retailers use the changes 
to network prices as an opportunity to offer a new wave of 
innovative products and services to existing and potential 
customers. This is harder to achieve in states where regulators 
must approve new products or price structures before they are 
made available to customers. It is one more reason why such 
regulation should be eliminated. 
4.4.2 Smarter meters 
The adoption of capacity and critical peak tariffs requires interval 
or smart meters. There has been a push to roll out these meters 
more widely over the last few years. The mandatory roll-out of 
smart meters in Victoria between 2009 and 2013 is the leading 
example. The widespread adoption of rooftop solar has also 
required the installation of interval meters to measure inflows and 
outflows of power, so that households can be paid for electricity 
sent from the home.  
Some distribution businesses have also installed interval meters 
as part of ongoing meter replacement programs. For example, 
Ausgrid in New South Wales supplies power to around 1.6 million 
customers. Over half a million of these customers have interval 
meters, 3000 customers have ‘advanced’ interval meters and 
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nearly 18,000 have smart meters.41 Energex, a distribution 
business in south-east Queensland, have around 1.3 million 
customers. Of these, 300,000 already have interval meters.42 
A national mandated rollout of smart meters seems unlikely in the 
foreseeable future due to the perceived deficiencies of Victoria’s 
mandatory smart meter rollout, uncertainties regarding the net 
benefit of the rollout, and the difficulties in resolving who should 
pay for the meters, given that retailers, network businesses and 
customers will all share in the benefits.43 
The debate has been distorted by the experience of the 
mandatory rollout in Victoria. A 2011 review of the program 
concluded that over 2008-28 it would result in a net cost to 
customers of $319 million.44 As with many such programs, the 
benefits were lower and the costs higher than the original analysis 
had estimated. Because other Australian jurisdictions have little 
appetite for repeating this experience, the tariff reform process 
and rate of uptake for smart meters across Australia under a 
market-based approach is likely to be slow.45 
There is a case for expanding the types of businesses that are 
able to install meters on customers’ homes. While distribution 
network businesses should oversee most smart meter rollouts, 
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regulatory barriers to third party providers and major roles for 
retailers should be removed, subject to third parties supplying 
meters that are compatible with the needs of existing systems.46 
Meter rollouts should also be included when network businesses 
are considering capital investment to augment or expand the 
network. This report argues that businesses should be required to 
consider alternatives - including the introduction of critical peak 
pricing in certain locations - that could remove or at least 
postpone the need for such investment. Such alternative 
assessments would need to include the cost of smart meters if 
such meters are not in place in areas where the network is 
constrained. 
Other countries have taken a different approach. The British 
Government has adopted a mandatory rollout of smart meters by 
2020. Installing smart meters is expected to provide £6.2 billion of 
net benefits to the UK over the years to 2030.47 The program will 
cost £10.9 billion and is expected to deliver £17.1 billion in 
benefits. 
Progress in Australia should be monitored so that if uptake turns 
out to be slow, policy makers could update analysis in the light of 
the latest information and data on both the benefits and costs 
across the full electricity supply chain. 
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4.4.3 Consumer inertia 
Electricity consumers do respond to price signals. More than 
70 per cent of households in south-east Queensland have chosen 
to accept a market offer from a private retailer rather than remain 
on the regulated tariff set by the state government regulator, the 
Queensland Competition Authority.48 Across Australia, feed-in 
tariffs and falling technology costs have led more than a million 
homes to install rooftop solar.49 
The historically unprecedented fall in electricity consumption over 
the last five years also shows that consumers respond to price, 
particularly when change is made easier by the availability of a 
wide range of choices, including smarter and more efficient 
appliances. Australian trials of critical peak pricing also suggest 
that customers would reduce their peak consumption by between 
23 and 35 per cent in response to higher prices at peak times.50 
The Productivity Commission explored consumer responsiveness 
to time-based prices in some detail.51 It concluded that providing 
customers with access to information about the savings available 
through changing patterns of consumption, and information about 
technologies and devices that would help to deliver these savings, 
was essential to change. 
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4.5 Longer term 
Network tariff reform can make electricity prices fairer and 
cheaper. Customers will be given more choice in the way they use 
electricity, and network companies can better match expenditure 
to real customer needs. But reform is never easy, particularly 
when multiple parties are involved. Delivering these benefits will 
require a sustained commitment from governments, regulators 
and electricity businesses. It is a commitment worth making. 
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